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INTRODUCTION
Significant controversy has surrounded the development
of freestanding emergency departments (EDs) in the
United States. This controversy is a part of a larger narrative
about how the US health care system meets the acute and
emergency care needs of patients. Both the absolute
number1,2 and the intensity of ED visits3 have increased in
recent years, placing a significant burden on hospital-based
EDs. This increase is certainly due in part to the advances
in clinical care that have steadily increased life expectancy
in the United States,4 but it also results from changes in the
health care delivery system. Market forces, including the
consolidation and closure of hospitals,5,6 the reduction in
inpatient beds, and the transition of many formerly
hospital-based procedures and interventions to outpatient
practice,7 have increased the number of patients with
complex medical conditions who are living in the
community. The outpatient infrastructure has not grown
in a manner sufficient to compensate for inpatient closures.
In many communities, supply does not meet demand and
long wait times for unscheduled care remain the norm.
Despite the rhetoric about patient centeredness, the policy
community repeatedly uses words such as “inappropriate”
or “unnecessary” to describe patients who seek care when
they are concerned that something is wrong or seek
unscheduled care on their terms.
Solving the acute care crisis will require cooperation
across medical specialties, payers, policymakers, and
patients. Favored innovations such as patient-centered
medical homes, concierge or boutique practices, and open-
access primary care initiatives often limit the number of
patients in a practice and ultimately include only a small
proportion of Americans. Payers are currently testing larger
models, including accountable care organizations and
comprehensive primary care,8 that seek to control the cost
of care for chronic conditions, but have limited focus on
acute conditions or acute exacerbations of chronic
conditions. In the end, most mainstream interventions are
fundamentally structured around a primary care model, but
the reality is that sicker individuals managed as outpatients
with specialist care will intermittently require real-time
advanced diagnostics and therapeutics.
Newer innovations emerging outside of the dominant
policy mind-set—that the outpatient primary care system
should manage acute care—have been met with skepticism.
In addition to the standing objection to the use of EDs by
payers,9,10 professional societies have articulated concerns
about the use of retail clinics and urgent care centers,11,12
and disruptive innovations, such as direct telemedical
consultation with patients, have been stymied by efforts to
limit payment to providers who have a preexisting
relationship with the patient.13 Freestanding EDs are the
latest lightning rod in this debate.
FREESTANDING EDs
Unlike urgent care centers, which focus on low-acuity
injuries and nonemergency illness, freestanding EDs have
more sophisticated capabilities and are typically open for
extended hours, mostly 24 hours, 7 days a week. In recent
years, freestanding EDs have proliferated,14 mainly in
Texas (which had 0 in 2010 and 191 in 2016),15 Colorado,
and Arizona. Freestanding EDs have grown in popularity
among the general public, but there is little evidence to
determine how they affect cost, quality, and access to care
for individual patients, as well as the health care system.
Although freestanding EDs have existed since the 1970s,
with the original intent to provide emergency services to
more rural areas without access to a hospital,16 the scant
literature that exists about them is outdated, given the
rapidly changing landscape. Overall, the most recent data
clarify several things about the current status of
freestanding EDs. First, they have become increasingly
popular among patients and are now seen as convenient
and reliable sources of emergency care.17 Second, most
freestanding EDs are capable of handling high-acuity cases,
provide quality comparable to that of hospital-based EDs
for diagnostic and therapeutic services,18 and compete with
hospital-based EDs for patient share. Third, they can be
lucrative and are proliferating wherever state legislation
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permits. Finally, consumers of acute care may not yet fully
understand the difference between urgent care centers and
freestanding EDs, which has associated cost implications.19
Not all freestanding EDs are the same. Payment
structures allow 2 distinct types to exist: freestanding EDs
affiliated with an existing hospital and considered satellite
EDs, and those that are truly freestanding and
independent. Furthermore, some “hybrid” models of
freestanding EDs allow patients to register in urgent care
status and convert to an ED patient (and charge fee) only if
their diagnostics evaluation requires ED-level resources.20
The article by Ho et al21 is one of the few studies that tries
to answer one of the most important questions in this shift in
the landscape of emergency services: how do utilization and
costs compare across freestanding and hospital-based EDs?*
The article by Ho et al had 2 key findings with respect to
utilization and costs: the use of freestanding EDs has
increased by 236% in a 4-year period, and the average price
of a visit to a freestanding ED has increased to nearly the
same level as the average visit to a hospital-based ED. As is
often the case, the story about cost has gotten greater press
than the story about an innovation that is potentially
meeting unmet demand; both deserve attention.
COST, CHARGES, AND PRICE
One of the main challenges in making sense of any study
discussing costs, charges, or prices is to clearly understand
the definitions used because these terms are often conflated
and can be misconstrued by academics, the media, and the
public. A “charge,” which can be understood as the “sticker
price,” or retail price, of a service, is not—as some might
expect—the same as the “price.” Charges can generally be
found on a hospital’s charge master, in which the hospital
lists the services and the amount they have decided to bill
for them.22 Outside of health care, the charge and price of
an item are the same. In health care, however, because of
the complex arrangements between providers and payers,
the price (or what one is expected to pay for the service) can
differ, depending on numerous factors. In this article, Ho
et al define price as the “amount the provider should be
paid by the insurer and patient together.” This price differs
if a facility or provider is “in network” with a health plan.
Facilities and health plans negotiate insurance payments
ahead of time, with facilities often granting health plan
discounts from the charge master rate. Patients are often
left to pay the difference between the price (total allowed
amount) and either the negotiated payment for an
in-network facility or the difference between the price and
the amount that the health plan decides to pay after the
service is rendered for out-of-network facilities. For
uninsured patients, the price is often the charge master rate,
which can be many times the price charged to a health
plan. Finally, price is not the same as the economist’s
definition of cost, which is the amount of resources
required to produce a certain commodity or service
(because no one in health care really knows the cost
of services).
In addition to understanding the distinction between
charges and prices, it is essential to understand that ED
visits generate 2 charges, one for the facility and one for the
provider. Although provider fees are relatively comparable
for ED visits and other outpatient visits,23 facility fees are
specific to hospital-based services, including ED visits, and
have been used to improve health system revenue.24 As
shown by Ho et al, these fees can be costly and are the
major contributor to the higher cost frequently associated
with ED care. Facility fees exist to offset the fixed costs (ie,
overhead) associated with running a hospital continuously.
Although rarely framed as such, they essentially represent a
cost shift, a means by which to distribute the cost of
ensuring that a hospital’s facilities, equipment, and staff are
ready at all times.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO CURRENT KNOWLEDGE
How does understanding these very cumbersome terms
help us distill the lessons from the article by Ho et al? These
definitional differences are not simply semantics. Price in
this article is defined as the price that the patient sees and,
from that perspective, is a significant contribution to the
national conversation of how freestanding EDs affect
patient cost. Had the article by Ho et al reported charges,
we could easily dismiss them as fairly useless because
insurers negotiate with providers to determine their
reimbursement rates and, after all, the study examined
claims of insured individuals. Had the article by Ho et al
reported true costs (which is almost impossible to do in the
US health care system), that also would have mattered little
to the patient because our system of payment is not based
on true costs. Instead, Ho et al used total allowed amount,
which enables the patient to see the effect of the visit to a
freestanding ED compared with a hospital-based ED in a
very direct way: what is the amount that both my insurer
and I are required to pay for this service? In essence, then,
this choice of a price term also provides a societal
framework for which to study the relative value of
freestanding EDs because even though the amount the
insurer pays is not directly related to the patient for this
specific instance, in the long run, higher outlays by the
*The authors purport to include an additional comparator—urgent care
centers—but for reasons explained in the accompanying editorial by Dr.
Callaham, they are not suitable for direct comparison.
876 Annals of Emergency Medicine Volume 70, no. 6 : December 2017
Don’t Hate the Player; Hate the Game Hsia, King & Carr
insurer will inevitably lead to higher premiums for the
patient.
Given the policy community’s interest in simply denying
claims for some types of “nonemergency” visits,9,10 no
dialogue on this subject would be complete without
addressing the reality that a diagnosis can’t always be used to
determine the intensity of service (and the related total
allowed amount) required. Any comparisons across acute
care settings require adjustment by patient severity so that,
for example, a 70-year-old with a history of aortic dissection,
gastrointestinal bleeding, and metastatic colon cancer who
eventually receives a diagnosis of abdominal pain after a
negative evaluation result in the ED is not classified the same
way as a 16-year-old who ate some bad chicken. Although
somework has been done to develop a chief complaint–based
framework by which to benchmark resource intensity in
diagnostic evaluations,25 the predominant model remains
diagnosis codes, a method so fraught with challenges that it
verges on useless. In past work, 13% of patients with
nonemergency diagnoses were demonstrated to require
hospital admission (of whom 11% required ICU care and
3% were taken to the operating room).26
MEETING AN UNMET DEMAND: THE PATIENT’S
PERSPECTIVE
Lost in much of the payer-based discussion on the
relative costs of care at a freestanding ED compared with
other settings is the inherently patient-centered reality that
these facilities may be meeting a need. Access to acute care
has become a national crisis during the last 2 decades, and
cost concerns have driven payers to divert patients from
EDs into the overwhelmed primary care system and
discourage ED use through co-payment and other
disincentives. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services (CMS) developed quality-reporting measures to
provide incentive for rapid ED throughput. These quality-
reporting measures put pressure on many EDs to discharge
or admit patients quickly or be penalized.
Faced with public shaming through star ratings or
financial penalties, the acute care community did what the
private sector does in response to incentives: they
innovated. Favored programs focused on the management
of chronic conditions, such as hospital at home,
identification of superusers, and Project Extension for
Community Healthcare Outcomes, have been warmly
received.27,28 Acute care–focused solutions, including
community paramedicine, retail clinics, urgent care
centers, direct-to-consumer telemedicine, and now
freestanding EDs, however, have been met with mixed
reception.
The question of whether these innovative delivery
models are equally distributed has been particularly
sensitive. Profitable services, such as cardiac catheterization
and percutaneous coronary intervention, have been
systematically located—like urgent care centers29 and
freestanding EDs30—in areas with better patient payer mix
and more affluence.31,32 For example, although there was a
44% relative increase in the number of percutaneous
coronary intervention laboratories in the United States
from 2001 to 2006, it increased relative access to less than
1% of the population.33 These studies provide evidence of
what we already know to be true: locations for new health
care service providers are chosen according to business
feasibility rather than solely patient need. These decisions,
although financially sound and business savvy, risk
systematic duplication of services in affluent areas with
health care services until the market saturates and do not
address the significant access gaps for low-income, high-
need communities.
THE GAME AND THE PLAYERS
The problem here is with the game, not the players. Like
all players, health care providers respond to the rules and
incentives of the game they are playing in self-interested
ways. Although current knowledge specifically about
freestanding ED behavior is limited, an overwhelming
amount of evidence from health care in general suggests
that although providers in the United States continue to
exist in a market-based system, they will continue to
respond to market-based incentives to earn profits, if not
profit maximize. For-profit environments, and nonprofit
environments that resemble for-profit environments (ie,
many nonprofit hospitals), tend to accelerate more
economic and profit-driven behavior.34,35 Existing
literature shows that for-profit institutions are less likely to
offer safety-net services,36 more likely than their nonprofit
or government counterparts to close their EDs,37 and more
likely to have higher markups on services (aka cost-to-
charge ratios).38 Without substantial incentives or
regulations to encourage health care entities to open clinics
in underserved areas or to charge less than the distorted
market will bear, we will continue to see current prices and
disparities in the allocation of resources.
Said differently, choosing to locate new freestanding
EDs in areas in which an insured population with acute
care needs lives was, and is, a sound business decision.
Freestanding ED growth in these areas may not solve
the access crisis among the lower-income or uninsured
populations, nor does it reflect the safety-net component of
emergency care’s mission, but in a dispassionate manner,
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the proliferation of freestanding EDs and other acute care
innovations is simply expected market behavior. If not for
their costs, the narrative on freestanding EDs might be that
they are a welcome release valve for struggling hospital-
based EDs charged with absorbing the acute care needs of a
population that is aging and fragile. Rather than
condemning freestanding EDs for failing to control costs,
the challenge might be to better understand how to blend
them into the health care system.
POTENTIAL POLICY TOOLS TO CREATE A
BETTER GAME
For the emergence of innovation in acute care to be
properly analyzed, it is important to examine the context of
the system in which it exists. Subspecialty reimbursement
has driven medical students away from primary care.
Limited providers and full schedules have decreased access
to the primary care system. Payer incentives have moved
health care to an outpatient model. And fragile patients
living at home, along with generally healthy people with a
medical concern, need care and often struggle to access the
existing system. Given this context, freestanding EDs offer
a potential alternative to the overburdened status quo of
hospital-based EDs.
But in a policy debate focused on cost, freestanding
EDs’ potential role in health care delivery is often lost. As
we pivot from cost to value (outcome divided by cost),
determining what we expect to get for our money becomes
essential. If the priority is access to health care in
underserved and at-risk communities, policymakers and
payers can design incentives to promote those goals. If the
goal is to create competition in the acute care
marketplace—whether to decrease wait times, transform
the patient experience, or decrease costs relative to hospital-
based EDs—market forces, payment structures, and
regulatory incentives can be developed to get us there.
However, it is critical to clearly identify the policy goals we
want to achieve before taking any particular action.
Although states may have different goals because of
differing environments (eg, care in rural areas, additional
competition in highly monopolistic or concentrated
markets), articulating an absolute choice about what an
ideal acute care system in the state would look like, and
how much the citizens are willing to pay for it, should be
the primary goal of any policymaker attempting to improve
the system. Those who create the rules of the game must
understand cost, but their motivation must arise from the
needs of the patient and the population. Below we describe
approaches to addressing 2 of the most common (and
sometimes conflicting) priorities in the acute care policy
debate.
Providing Care to Underserved Areas
The social justice, or safety net, role of the emergency
care system has been well described, legislatively secured,
and largely embraced by the emergency care community.
Simultaneously, because approximately half of all
emergency services are uncompensated in the United
States,39 tension exists between this role and more
traditional interests of delivering high-quality emergency
care under traditional payment structures. Over the years,
several policy tools have been used by states to promote
care in underserved areas and prevent duplication of
services. To promote access to care in underserved
populations, states could require new freestanding EDs to
receive previous approval through certificate-of-need
programs or licensing requirements. Alternatively, state,
federal, or private payers could create incentives to
encourage freestanding ED or other actors to meet the
acute care needs of these communities in very specific and
targeted ways. The following policy options can be used
independently or in combination, depending on the goals
of the regulating entity.
Certificate-of-need laws generally prohibit new or
existing health care providers from creating a new provider
entity or expanding facilities or services without
demonstrating a genuine public need in the relevant
geographic market.40 In states with certificate-of-need laws,
private entities typically must receive a certificate of need
from the state health department before proceeding with
any development that meets the state’s designated threshold
for expansion review. Although at one point every state had
a certificate-of-need program, certificate-of-need laws have
fallen out of favor in many states and federal agencies
because of criticisms that they failed to control costs and
they decreased quality. After extensive study, the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice concluded
that certificate-of-need laws created a barrier to market
entry by firms that could provide higher-quality care or
innovative care methods. In some instances, existing
providers had exploited the certificate-of-need process to
prevent or delay entry by competitors to protect their
supracompetitive rates.41 In the case of freestanding EDs,
hospital systems have reportedly lobbied during the
certificate-of-need process to prevent freestanding ED
construction near their facilities to avoid competitor
entry.42 In the 24 states with certificate-of-need programs,
certificate-of-need laws have been a large deterrent of
freestanding ED growth43; the majority of freestanding
EDs are in Texas, Colorado, and Arizona, which are
non–certificate-of-need states.44
Rather than instituting a regulatory process subject to
influence by competitors, states could consider creating a
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licensing program that clearly establishes criteria that
coincide with the state’s health care needs and patient
population. To date, states have instituted 3 types of
licensing schemes related to freestanding EDs. First, states
have permitted freestanding EDs to operate under the license
of an affiliated parent hospital. After an initial pilot program,
Florida chose to require freestanding EDs to meet the same
criteria as onsite EDs and allow them to operate only under
their parent-hospital state license.41 Second, states have
created specific licenses for freestanding EDs, which are
typically similar to hospital ED requirements, including
acceptance of all patients arriving at the facility, stabilization,
and provision for transport when necessary.45,46 Third, a
state that wanted to avoid freestanding EDs could narrow its
ED definition and requirements significantly to prohibit
licensure of freestanding EDs, as California has done.47
Again, policymakers should establish a clear set of priorities
and apply them equally to existing and novel entrants into
the acute care marketplace. Reactive regulation risks losing
any potential benefits that could arise from freestanding EDs
(eg, limiting licenses to existing hospitals) and an overly
permissive approach might fail to balance the interests of the
public with the interests of the firm.
In addition to regulatory and licensing policies, payment
incentives can also promote policy goals. For instance, a state
with highly competitive urban and suburban health care
markets, but underserved rural communities, could provide
incentive to freestanding EDs (or other health care models)
to locate and operate in areas with the greatest need rather
than communities with the highest proportion of privately
insured individuals.48 For example, policymakers could
enable all freestanding EDs that open in underserved areas to
collect hospital facility fees or other incentive payment. Two
forms of freestanding EDs currently exist: satellite branches
of a parent hospital, and independent freestanding EDs that
are unaffiliated with any other hospital. Only satellite
freestanding EDs are currently eligible for Medicare
reimbursement for their facility fee because they operate
under the hospital license, which enables them to bill CMS
for their services. Currently, independent freestanding EDs
do not qualify for facility fee reimbursement because CMS
permits hospital outpatient departments to operate under
the license of their parent hospital only if they are within a
35-mile radius.49 CMS could consider relaxing its 35-mile
distance rule in certain instances if the freestanding ED
demonstrated that it increased access to emergency care in an
underserved area.
Alternatively, Congress can also provide incentive for
freestanding EDs to provide care in rural areas with
targeted payment structures. Senate Bill 1130, for instance,
the Rural Emergency Acute Care Hospital, would allow
CMS to reimburse facility fees to freestanding EDs in rural
areas where the fixed costs of operating a hospital are more
expensive, given the lower volume. Specifically, the bill
officially recognizes “rural emergency hospitals” as a new
facility type with specific qualifications and benefits, and
proposes reimbursing services at 110% of reasonable cost.50
This payment adjustment is especially important because
current Medicare payments use cost of living, as defined by
the geographic practice cost index, to adjust payments,
which unfortunately ignores the challenges of attracting
physicians to live in rural areas. Several states, including
Georgia and Mississippi, have either already approved rules
to govern rural emergency hospitals or are piloting these
programs.51 In a similar vein, many rural hospitals
currently qualify for lower payment rates (type B Hospital
Outpatient Prospective Payment System) because they are
not open 24 hours a day.15 Allowing them to receive
payment rates equivalent to type A rates could provide
incentive for more service providers to locate there, or at
least support the current provision of service in these areas.
Finally, a number of novel payment structures currently
being tested by payers, including accountable care
organizations and global budgets, may help to inform how
to best meet the acute care needs of a community. Aligning
payment structures with a focus on community and
population health and an eye toward meeting acute care
needs offers promise if done correctly (ie, ensuring that
“communities” or “populations” are defined in an inclusive
manner rather than simply as within health system
networks). The Pennsylvania Department of Health has
partnered with CMS to develop a rural health payment
model that will give hospitals some freedom to deliver care
not available under traditional payment structures.
Although the focus is on preventive services, a natural
extension to include new acute care models exists.52
Promoting Competition in Acute Care Markets
The acute care delivery system in the United States has
been widely criticized for being expensive, crowded,
fragmented, and low value. Given this, policymakers (eg,
states, payers) may want to provide incentive for
freestanding ED entry into a market that already has a
dominant hospital-based ED to promote competition over
access, price, and quality. Allowing institutions with new
innovative models of care the opportunity to enter a market
and compete has the potential to change existing norms
within our health care markets and drive change across all
providers. Without proper oversight, however, this
approach can easily backfire. First, freestanding ED entry
into a market dominated by a hospital-based ED can result
in shadow pricing, in which the freestanding ED entry fails
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to decrease prices and instead charges only slightly less than
the hospital-based ED. Second, freestanding ED presence
in a market could result in cost competition that
paradoxically worsens quality. There are inadequate data at
present to determine whether quality of care is superior at
freestanding EDs or hospital-based EDs. On one hand,
locating freestanding EDs in areas already served by
hospital-based EDs, which generally have more specialty
services (eg, cardiac catheterization, surgical services), could
result in delayed care as a result of transfers.17 Hospital-
based EDs, however, compete for resources (eg, computed
tomography scan, laboratory, pharmacy, consultants) with
other components of the hospital. If subspecialty services
are made to compete for business from freestanding EDs, a
buyer’s market could emerge that might improve service.
Licensing regulations can be used to achieve goals of
promoting competition, decreasing costs, and improving
quality. For a hospital to participate in the Medicare
program, CMS requires that “[i]f emergency services are
provided at the hospital.policies and procedures governing
medical care provided in the emergency service or
department are established by and are a continuing
responsibility of the medical staff.”53 Currently, however,
CMS does not set standards for what defines emergency care.
In fact, although a clear articulation of what services and staff
are required for some specialty designations (eg, trauma
center, stroke center) exists, a clear standard of resources and
capabilities, a tiered structure of levels of an “ED,” or a panel
of outcomes that are used to benchmark emergency care,
does not. The introduction of freestanding EDs intomarkets
has in some cases required that these standards be defined54;
the degree to which similar standards exist for hospital-based
EDs is variable but, to date, not uniform. The introduction
of a novel acute and emergency care delivery model may
provide a compelling reason to define what is desired or
required from any acute care setting.
Payers, including government entities, can also intervene
financially to promote their policy goals with respect to
freestanding EDs with the use of facility fee eligibility. As
described earlier, facility fees are often a major driver of
price and are at the heart of the controversy in constraining
the market for emergency care. Some insurers argue that
because freestanding EDs do not bear the same overhead
costs as a hospital-based ED, they should be ineligible for
facility fees55; in fact, a 2014 senate bill in Colorado sought
to prohibit facility fees from independent freestanding EDs,
based on the rationale that they did not provide the same
on-site specialty services and consults.56 This type of
universal measure risks providing disincentive for
freestanding EDs to offer services in areas of true need, such
as more rural communities. A more reasonable and
implementable policy at the state level would be to limit
balance billing for facility fees, also briefly mentioned in the
article by Ho et al.
States and the federal government (because states do not
have the authority over health plans that are in self-funded
employer plans because of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act57 of 1974) can attempt to decrease
disparity between hospital-based EDs, satellite freestanding
EDs, and independent freestanding EDs by a combination
of requiring adequate coverage of emergency care by
insurance companies and regulating ED payments.
Although most of the current discussions about solutions
for the high costs of emergency care focus on regulating
physicians, it is critical to recognize that insurance
companies can refuse to contract with emergency groups,
which force beneficiaries into out-of-network care and then
shift the blame to emergency providers for being out of
network. States could more closely regulate insurers and
also set a minimum benefit standard that carriers are
required to pay for emergency care.
The crux of rate regulation is defining what “usual,
customary, and reasonable” charges are. Earlier this year, the
Nevada legislature passed legislation,58 subsequently vetoed
by the governor, that would have required certain hospitals,
freestanding EDs, and physicians to accept certain rates as
payment in full for the provision of emergency services. All
Nevada EDs would have to accept as payment either the
average amount that the insurer has negotiated with other
hospitals in Nevada or 125% of the average amount paid by
Medicare for the same or similar services in the same
geographic area. The American College of Emergency
Physicians agrees with the idea in principle, although they
advocate a standard of the 80th percentile of FAIR Health
charges,59 similar to Connecticut’s Surprise Bill, which went
into effect July 1, 2016.60 Texas introduced but did not
successfully pass legislation granting the Texas attorney
general the authority and discretion to seek penalties and
injunctions against a hospital-based ED or freestanding ED
for unconscionable pricing.61 Instead, the Texas legislature
passed SB 507, which allows mediation of balance bills for
emergency care from any provider or facility of emergency
care services, including freestanding EDs.62 Although this
mediation process has allowed dispute resolution and
agreement between health plans and providers, it has also
significantly increased the burden on the Texas Department
of Insurance, which currently mediates these disputes, and
requires the patient to be balanced billed and file a complaint
(personal communication, Brad Shields, National
Association of Freestanding Emergency Centers, July 2017).
Ultimately, rate regulation across all types of providers, along
with adequate insurance coverage for emergency care, may
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enable freestanding EDs to compete and help control costs.
However, this is a significant deviation from how health care
is currently financed, and would likely have ramifications for
how we pay all health care providers.
FINAL THOUGHTS
What are the potential consequences of inaction? Most
likely, freestanding EDs will continue to proliferate in areas
in which there are few restrictions, potentially creating
more supply than demand. Health services research
demonstrates that geographic proximity to an ED can
induce demand and suggests that freestanding EDs may
not be pure substitutes for emergency care at a hospital-
based ED because patients may be more likely to seek care
at a conveniently located freestanding ED. To the extent
that freestanding EDs increase utilization without
improving outcomes, their presence can drive up costs for
insurers and, ultimately, patients who pay those premiums.
Claims that freestanding EDs can decrease ED crowding
have not yet been substantiated and certainly merit
investigation.
The development of freestanding EDs can be seen as a
microcosm of the US health care system, in which health
care is largely considered like any other industry and
assumed to function as a market good. On some level,
market forces will likely act to force some freestanding EDs
to close if there is excessive redundancy. Simultaneously,
empiric evidence demonstrates that the market for health
care fails to meet many of the conditions required for a free
market to function. The complete lack of information on
the cost, charges, or price of care, and their relationship to
quality, for example—all of which are unknown to the
patient, who cannot be expected to act as a rational
customer even in the best of circumstances, much less when
ill—are not singular to patients presenting to EDs, whether
they be freestanding or hospital based. Rather than simply
casting blame on the players who are providing emergency
care within the current structure, the debate over
freestanding ED represents an important call to action for
policymakers, payers, and patients; it is time to identify our
priorities and to create incentives that drive innovation to
meet the population’s needs.
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Representatives of BCBS were asked to attest to the completeness
and validity of the data they provided to Dr. Ho. The Senior Director for
Media and Public Relations for BCBS Texas sent a description of the
methods and themultiple academic organizations who supported the
research. We interpreted the following statement as their attestation:
“Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas firmly supports the work done
by the non-biased researchers led by Dr. Vivian Ho at Rice
University’s Baker Institute. We stand by the accuracy of the data
used in the study.”
Additionally two other separate requests were sent to executives of
national BCBS asking if they would be willing to have the data
reviewed for completeness and accuracy by an impartial third party
(the only intervention that could convincingly confirm or rebut the
concerns about data manipulation). Neither request received any
reply from BCBS.
The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the US
government.
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